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LEGISLATIVE NOTES:
MICHIGAN'S REVISED MENTAL HEALTH CODE
In May 1974 Michigan's civil commitment procedures were declared
unconstitutional in Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital.' The court
found that several provisions deprived involuntarily committed persons
of their liberty without due process of law.2 Similar procedures in other
jurisdictions were under attack by courts and commentators for this
reason, 3 and because they failed to adequately safeguard the individual's
constitutional rights once he has been confined in a mental institution.
4
Michigan enacted a new Mental Health Code in August 1974, in an at-
tempt to modernize its outdated procedures and protect the constitutional
rights of the mentally ill.5 In addition, Michigan needed new legislation
to safeguard the newly recognized constitutional rights of persons com-
mitted because they are incompetent to stand trial, or have been acquitted
of crimes by reason of insanity.
6
This note will evaluate the three chapters of the Michigan Code which
present the most significant legislative attempts to safeguard the rights
of the mentally ill. Chapter Four of the Code extends several traditional
due process guarantees to the civil commitment process. By guaranteeing
the right to adequate notice, the right to be present at the hearing,
the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to notice of trial
by jury, the Code offers better protection from unwarranted commit-
ment. However, due to the difficulty of defining mental illness and
accurately identifying those in need of treatment, the possibility
of improper commitment still exists. Chapter Seven protects the rights
of residents of mental health facilities by ensuring that each resident re-
1 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
2 E.g., Law of July 3, 1957, no. 313, § 1, [19571 Mich. Laws 615, amending Law
of May 10, 1923, no. 151, §§ 11, 44, [1923] Mich. Laws 225 (repealed 1974).
3 See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also authorities cited in part I
infra.
4 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), vacating and remanding
493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
afl'd in part, modified in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). See also authorities cited in part II infra.
5 MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1001 et seq. (1975). P.A. 1974, No. 258 was
enacted August 6, 1974. Except for chapters 4, 5, and 8 which became effective
November 6, 1974, the Act became law August 6, 1975.
6 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); People v. McQuillan, 392
Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974). See also authorities cited in part III infra.
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ceives treatment suited to his condition, and by restricting the use of
psychosurgery, electroshock therapy, restraint, and seclusion. While these
statutes are often vague and permit the hospital to exercise its discretion,
the administrative rules of the Department of Mental Health augment
the Code, and often provide the necessary substance to a broadly worded
statute. Chapter Ten of the Code governs the disposition of persons
found incompetent to stand trial or acquitted by reason of insanity, and
protects them from indeterminate commitments by requiring the state either
to commit them pursuant to the civil commitment process or to release
them from custody. It is these criminal provisions of the Code which have
been most criticized by those who fear that the extension of due process
and equal protection safeguards to criminals has resulted in inadequate
protection of the rights of society.
I. CIVIL COMMITMENT IN MICHIGAN
According to Bell,7 Michigan's civil commitment procedures deprived
subjects of commitment petitions of due process. This occurred while the
legislature was already considering a new mental health code. When the
new Code was enacted three months later, it implemented the due process
guarantees found lacking in Michigan's prior commitment statute.
A. Procedural Guarantees
1. Right to Notice-The Bell court found Michigan's existing notice
procedures defective in merely requiring that notice of the petition be
served at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, with no requirement
that the petition itself be served upon the person facing commitment.,
The new Code requires that notice of the petition be served early enough
to permit adequate preparation of that person's case, and directs the court
to send a copy of the petition itself to the subject.a This procedure enables
the subject of the petition to discover the allegations against him and to
ascertain who is seeking his commitment. 10
7 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
8 ld. at 1092-93.
0 MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1453 (1975). This section also requires notice
of the time and place of the hearing to be sent to the subject and his attorney, as
well as notice of the right to a full court hearing, to be present, to demand a jury
trial, to be represented by counsel, and to secure an independent medical examination.
The Michigan Supreme Court's Administrative Order 1974-7, 392 Mich. xxxv (Nov.
6, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Order] requires such notice to be
served at least two days before the preliminary hearing and at least five days before
the time of other hearings, unless a lesser time is agreed to by the subject or his
attorney.
10 See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DIs-
ABLED AND THE LAW 51-53 (rev. ed. 1971) for a discussion on the propriety of afford-
ing notice to an allegedly mentally ill person. Psychiatrists contend that legal pro-
cedures and papers produce anxiety and confusion, causing more harm than good.
However, the editors assert that the receipt of notice could not be more traumatic
than sudden institutional confinement. The latter view is supported in Developments
in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1274
SPR.ING 1976]
Journal of Law Reform
2. Right to Be Present-Bell held that Michigan law did not adequately
safeguard the fundamental due process right to be present at one's hear-
ing.1 1 Under the prior statute a court could exclude the subject of a petition
merely upon certification by two physicians that his presence would be
"improper and unsafe.' 1 2 The court reasoned that since the threat to
liberty is as significant in the context of civil commitments as it is in
criminal trials, the right to be present should be as broad in the former as
it is in the latter.13 Michigan law now provides that a person "shall be
present at all hearings," unless he waives that right, and the court is satis-
fied that his presence would be "injurious" to him. 14 Furthermore, the
statute requires the court to convene hearings in the hospital whenever
practicable, thereby securing the right to be present to those whose con-
dition would otherwise prevent their appearance in court. 15
While it might be argued that an individual's presence promotes fairness
by enabling the court to speak with and observe the individual, and com-
pare these observations with psychiatric testimony,16 this may also have
prejudicial consequences. For instance, it is possible that an individual,
who has been hospitalized against his will after physical apprehension by
police or health officers, subjected to demeaning hospital admission pro-
cedures, given tranquilizers which intensify his disorientation, and now
faces imprisonment, will exhibit anxiety and hostility when he finally gets
into the courtroom. I If he appears agitated and nervous as a result of
hospital custody, or incoherent and uncoordinated from sedation, his
behavior will corroborate the psychiatric testimony.' s
3. Right to Counsel-Bell also declared that the right to counsel in
civil commitment proceedings is a fundamental due process right for
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments--Civil Commitment] where it is argued
that the expectation of trauma as a result of the service of notice presupposes that
the subject of the petition is in fact mentally ill, an issue which has not yet been
determined by the court. In fact, service of papers informing the individual of his
protections may reduce rather than increase his anxiety.
11 384 F. Supp. at 1094.
12 Law of July 3, 1957, no. 313, § 1, [1957] Mich. Laws 615, amending Law of
May 10, 1923, no. 151, § 11, [1923] Mich. Laws 225 (repealed 1974).
13 384 F. Supp. at 1094.
14 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1455 (1975). The Michigan Supreme Court's
Administrative Order, supra note 9, at xxxv, provides that the subject may waive the
right to be present if the waiver is in open court. There is no explicit requirement
that this waiver be voluntary and intelligent. This should be compared with pro-
visions for waiver of the right to counsel, note 26 and accompanying text infra.
Moreover, the court is permitted to exclude the subject from the hearing where his
behavior makes it impossible to continue.
15 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1456 (1975).
16 Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1282-83.
17 Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency
Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLAaA LAW. 400, 416-28 (1973).
1s Id. Michigan law now requires that no chemotherapy be administered to a
hospitalized individual until after the preliminary hearing, nor can it be administered
on the day before the full court hearing unless the patient consents, or unless admin-
istration is necessary to prevent physical injury to the individual or others. MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. § 330.1718 (1975).
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which prior Michigan law did not adequately provide.' 9 Relying upon
Lessard v. Schmidt,20 Bell held that there is a right to counsel, to be court
appointed if necessary, at every stage of the commitment proceedings.
21
The new Code guarantees to every subject of a petition the right to
counsel, appointed counsel if the individual is indigent, 22 and requires
that notice of this right be given in all cases.2 3 Although the Michigan
Supreme Court's Administrative Order, which promulgates court rules
necessary to the effective implementation of the new law, permits the
subject of a petition to waive counsel if done voluntarily and understand-
ingly in open court, it provides that no waiver may be accepted until the
individual has consulted counsel. 24 Based upon the individual's behavior
at such a consultation an attorney should theoretically be able to encour-
age the individual to accept representation or to submit evidence to the
court that any waiver would be incompetent. 25 However, this could place
the attorney in the unenviable position of asserting his client's incapacity
to waive counsel, thereby corroborating psychiatric testimony as to the
subject's mental condition. However, one's capacity to make a knowing
waiver of the right to counsel should be distinguished from the quantity
19 384 F. Supp. at 1092-93. Law of July 3, 1957, no. 313, § 1, [1957] Mich. Laws
615, amending Law of May 10, 1923, no. 151, § 11, [1923] Mich. Laws 225 (re-
pealed 1974) merely required that a guardian ad litem be appointed in cases where
substitute service was utilized. There was no requirement that the guardian ad litem
be an attorney.
20 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) in which the court stated that
[t]here seems to be little doubt that a person detained on grounds of
mental illness has a right to counsel, and to appointed counsel if the
individual is indigent.
id. at 1097.
21 384 F. Supp. at 1093.
22 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1454 (1975). This section also requires that the
court appoint an attorney for an individual who has no attorney. Counsel must be
appointed within forty-eight hours of the court's receipt of any petition seeking
involuntary commitment, or within twenty-four hours after the subject is hospitalized
pursuant to medical certification or court order. For a discussion of the role and
impact of the attorney in commitment proceedings see Andalman & Chambers, Eflec-
tive Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a
Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 424 (1966); Developments--Civil
Commitment, supra note 10, at 1283-91; Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the
Mentally Il Under Florida's Baker Act: Procedural Due Process and the Role of the
Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 508 (1974); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975).
23 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1453 (1975).
24 Administrative Order, supra note 9, at xxxiv.
25 A more questionable practice is allowing persons facing involuntary commit-
ment to agree to sign a voluntary commitment form without first consulting an
attorney. The right to counsel should include the right to consultation with counsel
before signing a voluntary commitment form as well as consultation before execu-
ting a valid waiver of counsel. One Detroit attorney suggests that the signing of a
voluntary commitment form should be closely scrutinized in view of the "suspi-
ciously high" ratio of voluntary commitment forms signed in certain hospitals.
(Letter on file in the office of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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and quality of evidence required to establish that the individual is a person
requiring treatment under the statutory standard.
26
4. Right to Trial by Jury-Prior to Bell, Michigan did not require that
the subject of a petition be informed of his right to a jury trial, but per-
mitted such trials upon the individual's request or the court's initiative.
27
Although Michigan law now requires that notice of the right to demand a
jury trial be served upon the subject of a petition, 28 Bell did not hold
that the right to a jury trial is an element of due process in an involuntary
civil commitment hearing. The court merely relied upon the Lessard
holding that a person should be informed of his statutory right to a jury
trial, and that adequate notice is necessary to inform an individual of
all such statutory rights. 29 One commentator predicts that if the Supreme
Court were faced with the issue of whether a constitutional right to a jury
trial exists in a civil commitment proceeding, it would balance the pro-
cedural fairness and community involvement offered by the jury against
the state's interest in judicial economy and informality.30 This commen-
tator suggests that this balancing process would result in a finding that
such a requirement would place too great a burden on the state, and
hence is not constitutionally required.
5. Right to a Preliminary Hearing-Perhaps the most glaring constitu-
tional defect of Michigan's prior law was its authorization of temporary
commitment for a period of up to 120 days without a judicial hearing
on the necessity of detention. 31 The Bell court, citing Lessard,32 found the
26 Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) in which four Justices concluded
that the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to counsel imposes a weighty
responsibility on the trial judge to determine whether there has been an intelligent
and competent waiver. To be valid, a waiver had to be made with an understanding
of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses
or mitigating circumstances, and a broad understanding of the entire matter. In
order to safeguard the sixth amendment right to counsel in voluntary commitment
cases, it is arguable that there should be a presumption against the validity of any
waiver of counsel. However, a presumption of inability to waive counsel should not
be permitted since the individual facing commitment is presumed not to be mentally
ill and in need of treatment until the court finds otherwise.27 Law of July 3, 1957, no. 313, § 1, [1957] Mich. Laws 615, amending Law of
May 10, 1923, no. 151, § 11, [1923] Mich. Laws 225 (repealed 1974).28 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1453, 330.1458 (1975).
29 384 F. Supp. at 1094.
30 Developments--Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1295.
31 Law of July 3, 1957, no. 313, § 1, [1957] Mich. Laws 615, amending Laws of
May 10, 1923, no. 151, § 11, [1923] Mich. Laws 225 (repealed 1974) provided that:
[If it shall appear, upon the certificate of 2 legally qualified physicians,
... to be necessary and essential to do so, the court may order such
alleged mentally diseased person to be... detained until such petition
can be heard and determined or to be removed to any state hospital
for custody and treatment. The period of such temporary detention shall
not exceed 60 days, which period may be extended up to an additional
60 days by special order of the court ....
32 349 F. Supp. at 1090-91. The Wisconsin statute at issue in Lessard permitted
involuntary detention for up to 145 days without a hearing. The court conceded the
state's compelling interest in emergency detention but held that
such an emergency measure can be justified only for the length of time
[VOL. 9:620
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Michigan provision to be a deprivation of due process and suggested that
a preliminary hearing within five days of the initial detention would satisfy
procedural due process. 33 Michigan law now guarantees a preliminary
hearing within five days of hospitalization as well as the right of the sub-
ject to be present and to be represented by counsel at the hearing.
34
Despite substantial administrative difficulties, preliminary hearings
for persons detained without a hearing could be provided sooner than
five days after hospitalization. If the individual is hospitalized pursuant
to medical certification, his condition must be certified by a psychiatrist,
within twenty-four hours of his hospitalization. 35 If the individual is taken
into custody by police or brought to the hospital by a person seeking com-
mitment, the subject of the petition must be examined by a physician
within twenty-four hours. He may then be hospitalized but must be ex-
amined by a psychiatrist within an additional twenty-four hours.3 6 If he
is taken into custody pursuant to court order, and is not examined within
twenty-four hours, he must be released.3 7 -Thus, in all prehearing detention
cases, the individual has been examined by a physician and a psychiatrist
within forty-eight hours of his arrival, yet he may have to wait at least
three additional days for the preliminary hearing. If evidence exists to
establish probable cause, it will be available to the state within forty-eight
hours.38 An individual could not be prejudiced by an earlier hearing since,
if he had no attorney, the court would be required to appoint counsel
within twenty-four hours after he is hospitalized. 39 If the court-appointed
attorney were unprepared or unable to appear at an earlier hearing, it
could then be delayed in the interest of the subject. An earlier prelim-
necessary to arrange for a hearing before a neutral judge at which
probable cause for the detention must be established.
Id. at 1091.
33 384 F. Supp. at 1098.
34 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1450 (1975). If probable cause is not established,
the individual must be released immediately. A recent amendment permits a physi-
cian's certificate to be admitted into evidence at the preliminary hearing. The
certificate "shall constitute a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause to
believe than [sic] an individual is a person requiring treatment." Law of Aug. 25,
1975, no. 214, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 510, amending MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
330.1450 (1975). It appears that this amendment is a legislative response to physicians
who complained that testifying in person was time consuming and left too little
time to deal with other patients. See Comment, Problems of Chapters 4, 5, and 8 of
the New Michigan Mental Health Code, 1975 DET. C.L.L. REV. 229, 242. It is also
probable that the compensation for time spent in court does not adequately reim-
burse the physician for time which could have been spent treating patients. Never-
theless, the Code still requires that psychiatrists testify in person at the commitment
hearing. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1461 (1975).
35 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 330.1423, 330.1430 (1975).
36 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.4427-.1430 (1975).
37 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1438 (1975).
38 One possible administrative difficulty has been eliminated by relieving the phy-
sician from testifying at the preliminary hearing. See note 34 supra. If the physician's
certificate may be received in evidence without a personal appearance, the individual
may be deprived of the constitutional right to confront his accusers.
39 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1454 (1975).
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inary hearing would mitigate the prejudicial effects of pretrial detention40
and enable an individual to refute the evidence against him sooner than
is now possible.
41
6. No Commitments for Diagnosis-The Bell decision also nullified a
Michigan provision which enabled courts to commit individuals for diag-
nosis for periods of up to 120 days. 42 Such commitments had been per-
mitted where the court or jury determined that the individual was mentally
ill, but not to a degree which would warrant a final commitment order.
43
Thus, involuntary commitment for diagnosis could be ordered under a
less stringent standard than that applied to final involuntary commitment.
44
Michigan no longer permits commitments for diagnosis or observation
upon a finding of mental illness which does not meet the statutory standard
for final commitment. 45 The court may only decide whether or not the
person requires treatment. If treatment is required, the court may order
commitment to a public or private hospital, or it may order a program
of treatment other than hospitalization. An alternative to hospitalization
may be ordered only if the individual would have been hospitalized had
no alternatives existed.46 The court retains control of the individual
ordered to undergo the alternative, similar to the control exercised by a
court in its ability to revoke the probation of a criminal defendant. If the
person does not comply with the ordered treatment, or if the treatment
is insufficient, the court may revoke the alternative treatment and hos-
pitalize the individual without a hearing.47 Nevertheless, there can be no
involuntary commitment on evidence which would not satisfy the statutory
requirement of a "person requiring treatment.
' '48
40See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
41See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1276-99, which
criticizes the argument that a long prehearing detention would enable the hospital
to treat the individual's immediate problem, thereby avoiding the stigmatization of a
judicial hearing. Since no finding has yet been made that the individual requires
treatment, any lengthy detention without judicial authorization is a serious depriva-
tion of liberty. Moreover, in most cases not much time is needed to acquire enough
evidence to satisfy the probable cause standard.
42 384 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
43 Law of July 3, 1957, no. 313, § 1, [1957] Mich. Laws 615, amending Law of
May 10, 1923, no. 151, § 11, [1923] Mich. Laws 225 (repealed 1974).
44 Bell also found the statutory standard of mental illness unconstitutionally vague.
See part I B I infra.
45See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1468 (1975).
4 6 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1469 (1975).
47 Id. In view of the similarities between the civil commitment hearing and criminal
trials, and the recent extensions of statutory and constitutional due process pro-
tections to the civil commitment area, it is arguable that this revocation of alterna-
tive treatment resembles the deprivation of liberty incident to probation revocation.
In that setting it has been held that due process requires an informal hearing before
the individual's probation may be revoked. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Similarly one can argue that
due process requires an informal hearing before an individual may be committed to
a hospital.
48 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (1975). See part I B 1 infra.
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B. Admission and Release Provisions
1. Admission Standards4 -Michigan's civil commitment standard was
struck down in Bell as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 50 The court
noted that under that standard "virtually any mental disorder would qual-
ify" including many which "could not be classified as other than harm-
less." 51 Bell held that the state had no power to commit persons who were
not dangerous to themselves or others and, because the statute permitted
commitment upon a finding of mental illness alone, it was fatally overin-
clusive.
It is widely acknowledged that most involuntary commitment statutes
are worded so broadly that they do not precisely define the degree of men-
tal illness required to justify commitment. 52 The present Michigan stand-
ards5 3 are similar to those in fifteen other jurisdictions which authorize
commitment only if the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to himself
or others, or unable to care for his own physical needs. 54 The effectiveness
of these standards depends on psychiatric ability to diagnose dangerous-
ness. To the extent dangerousness can be accurately determined, the state
can more effectively protect its citizens from harm and preserve the free-
dom of nondangerous individuals who do not warrant institutionalization.
However, there is substantial support for the view that psychiatric ability
to diagnose mental illness or predict "dangerousness" is at best unreliable. 55
49 For a discussion of current involuntary commitment standards and the con-
stitutional bases for state authority, see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); Developments-
Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1201-65. For a survey of state commitment
standards and procedures see also S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 34-61.
50 384 F. Supp. at 1095-96. Formerly, mental illness was defined to
include every species of insanity and extend to every mentally de-
ranged person, and to all of unsound mind other than... persons who
manifest the general deterioration of mental processes, including dis-
orientation, confusion or impairment of memory, associated with
senility, but without psychotic implications.
Law of June 8, 1953, no. 183, § 1, [1953] Mich. Laws 240, amending Law of May 10,
1923, no. 151, § 44, [1923] Mich. Laws 237 (repealed 1974).
51 384 F. Supp. at 1095 (footnote omitted).
52 S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 39. See also R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION
AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 11 (1968) in which the author observes that
from the psychiatric viewpoint, a loose definition may be desirable since the question
is not who is ill, but rather of those who are ill, how many require hospitalization.
The author argues that a statute with rigid definitions may not be helpful since
mental disorders are widespread and the effect of a particular illness on an indi-
vidual's ability to function is subject to change.
53 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1401(a), (b) (1975), as amended, Law of
July 25, 1975, no. 179, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 381.
54 See Developments--Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1203.
55 See Note, The Language of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Study in
Sound and Fury, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 195, 197 (1970) in which a study to
"determine the reliability and validity of the bases for involuntary mental hospital-
ization" concluded that the diagnoses and recommendations of physicians "reflect a
procedure where obscure and questionable labels are offered by diagnosticians and
accepted by the court as conclusive of the underlying malady." Id. at 205. The study
suggests that involuntary commitment based upon unreliable diagnostic labels con-
stitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process. In fairness to the psychiatric
SPING 19761
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Indeed, some commentators advocate the abolition of the entire involuntary
civil commitment process in view of the lack of any scientifically reliable
method of predicting future dangerousness.56 In view of the difficulty of
predicting the type and extent of an individual's future dangerous be-
havior, statutes which authorize such police power commitments may be
constitutionally suspect.
57
Despite these problems, Michigan's new commitment standard is clearly
more precise than the standard held unconstitutional in Bell.58 The "dan-
gerousness" standard requires a reasonable expectation of physical harm
and requires actual acts or threats which support that expectation. 59 Based
on the language of the statute, anticipated or actual harm to property alone
does not justify commitment. Psychiatric testimony that an individual's
symptoms could lead to violent behavior should not justify commitment
without evidence that violent behavior has occurred or that there is reason-
able fear- of such behavior.60 While the court need not rely solely on psy-
chiatric testimony, the possibility of unwarranted commitment still exists.
This danger is present under any standard which contains such imprecise
phrases as "reasonably be expected" and "significant and substantially
supportive of that expectation." Judges may have differing conceptions of
behavior which may reasonably be expected to be dangerous. However,
discretion is inherent in any statute which attempts to prevent anticipated
harm.
61
profession, however, the study should have noted that the fault may more properly
be attributed to the court and legal profession which demand these labels, rather
than to the psychiatric profession which offers them.
See also R. ROCK, supra note 52, at 259; Comment, An End to Incompetency to
Stand Trial, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 560, 577 (1973) (concluding that the prosecu-
tion and court rely heavily, if not exclusively, on psychiatric reports).
56 See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
439 (1974) in which the author states:
I know of no reports in the scientific literature which are supported
by valid clinical experience and statistical evidence that describe
psychological, or physical signs or symptoms which can be reliably
used to discriminate between the potentially dangerous and the harm-
less individual.
id. at 444. Diamond concludes that courts should no longer ask for expert opinions
on the subject, and that experts should reveal their inability to make such predictions
when asked to do so. Id. at 452.
See also Roth, Dayley & Lerner, supra note 17, at 443-44:
Based on our analysis of psychiatry as unscientific and mental illness
as an arbitrary concept, we would favor the abolition of involuntary
mental hospitalization. Involuntary commitment of those considered
dangerous should be based on specific violations of the criminal law.
57 Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1245.
58 See note 50 supra.
59 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(a) (1975).
60 See Walker, Mental Health Law Reform in Massachusetts, 53 B.U.L. REV. 986,
994 (1973) in which the author suggests that, in order to commit an individual
under the Massachusetts dangerousness standard, the court should be presented
with evidence of suicide attempts or threats of violence to himself or others.
Evidence of serious depression would not be sufficient. The standard also contem-
plates proof of past violence or testimony that a witness is in fear of such behavior.
61 Id. at 994. The author points out that while, in one judge's opinion, a 20 per-
[VOL. 9:620
Revised Mental Health Code
Michigan's second commitment standard permits involuntary commit-
ment of mentally ill persons who are unable to attend to their "basic
physical needs."'62 The state utilizes its parens patriae power to protect the
interests and welfare of those citizens unable to care for themselves. Since
the state's justification is furthering the individual's interest rather than
protecting society, involuntary commitment on this basis should only be
permitted where an individual is proven incapable of making his own
determination as to his need for psychiatric treatment. 63 Nevertheless,
Michigan permits commitment of persons unable to care for themselves
despite their personal desire to remain free. As a policy matter, where
the individual is not dangerous to himself or others, his preference for
autonomy and privacy should be respected. Some observers suggest that
"incapacity" should be a prerequisite to parens patriae commitment, so
that, of those persons who refuse treatment, the state could validly over-
ride the choice only of those "incapable of evaluating the desirability of
psychiatric care."
'6 4
The Michigan Legislature recently amended the Code by adopting a
broad commitment standard which appears certain to face constitutional
challenge. 65 It permits the commitment of persons who are mentally ill
and unable to understand their need for treatment, and whose behavior
may result in harm to themselves or to others. 66 Because such a commit-
cent chance of harm may be substantial, another judge may require a greater likeli-
hood. A related problem is that of determining how soon the anticipated harm must
occur to support an involuntary commitment. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
330.1465 (1975), which provides that:
A judge or jury shall not find that an individual is a person requiring
treatment unless that fact has been established by clear and convincing
evidence.
There is dispute as to whether a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard better
protects the interests of the individual facing commitment. Compare In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (applies the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard to involuntary civil commitment) with Comment, supra note 55, at 577
which states, "The effects of requiring proof of mental illness or dangerousness be-
yond a reasonable doubt are nothing short of revolutionary." The author argues
that since psychiatry cannot accurately diagnose present mental disordzr or predict
future dangerousness, the stricter standard of proof could be met only by proving
that the individual has already committed a dangerous act which would bring him
within the reach of the criminal system.
6 2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(b) (1975).
63 Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1207-22.
64 Id. at 1215-16.
65-See Law of July 25, 1975, no. 179, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 381, amending MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1401 (1975). The amendment was part of a bill which
changed procedures for the disposition of persons acquitted of charges by reason
of insanity. According to 14 Gongwer News Serv., Mich. Report No. 144 (July
28, 1975), Michigan's Governor Milliken has indicated that the bill raises con-
stitutional questions which may have to be dealt with by the courts.
66 Law of July 25, 1975, no. 179, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 381, amending MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1401 (1975). A person requiring treatment is one:
who is mentally ill, whose judgment is so impaired that he is unable
to understand his need for treatment and whose continued behavior
as a result of this mental illness can reasonably be expected, on the
basis of competent medical opinion, to result in significant physical
harm to himself or others ....
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ment is pursuant to the state's police power, a clear showing of potential
dangerousness should be required.6 7 Yet it appears that less proof is re-
quired by this section than by the original dangerousness section since
only the prediction of a competent medical practitioner is required.68 The
statute requires a finding that a person's "continued behavior" be danger-
ous. While this language may presuppose an overt act requirement, no acts
or threats are explicitly required to support the prediction of dangerousness.
The statute seems to encompass all mentally ill persons, including those who
may not actually be dangerous. Such a standard was found unconstitu-
tional in Bell.69 The statute does suggest that the commitment of a person
dangerous to himself should only be ordered upon a showing of the in-
dividual's capacity to make his own treatment decision, yet section
330.1401(b), the "basic needs" standard, allows such commitments re-
gardless of the individual's capacity. 70 Thus, this final standard provides a
"pigeonhole" for persons who could not be committed under the other
two criteria.
It is clear that Michigan's new commitment standard was adopted in
order to facilitate civil commitment of persons acquitted of crimes by
reason of insanity. 71 The Code provides that persons acquitted for this
reason may not be committed automatically, but may be committed only
after a full civil commitment hearing to determine the individual's present
mental condition. 72 Legislators became alarmed at the prospect of releasing
acquitted persons who had committed crimes, but were not presently
mentally ill, and adopted more restrictive procedures governing the dis-
position of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity.73 Since the Mich-
igan Supreme Court has ruled that criminal defendants must be subject
to the same commitment standards as those committed under civil stand-
67 When the state seeks to vindicate a societal interest rather than to further the
interest of the mentally ill individual, it acts under its police power. This is the just-
ification for the use of involuntary civil commitment procedures to protect other
citizens from harm. See Developments--Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1222.
68 Compare Law of July 25, 1975, no. 179, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 381 with
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(a) (1975). See notes 59-61 and accompanying
text supra.
69 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
7 0 See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
71 State Representative Paul Rosenbaum said he recognized that the bill may be
held unconstitutional, but that it was intended as a stopgap measure to fill the void
created when the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the state cannot hold a person
in a mental institution when he has been acquitted by reason of insanity. 14 Gongwer
News Serv., Mich. Report No. 48, at 1 (March 11, 1975). See part III B infra.
7 2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050 (1975). See part III B 1 infra.
73 The new commitment standard was part of Mich. H.B. 4362, 78th Leg., 1975
Sess. (1975). The other provisions of that bill defined the duties of the court and
prosecuting attorney in reference to a person ordered committed for and after a
successful defense of insanity. Mich. H.B. 4362, 78th Leg., 1975 Sess. § 2 (1975)
provided that the bill would not take effect unless Mich. H.B. 4363, 78th Leg., 1975
Sess. (1975) was also enacted into law. Mich. H.B. 4363, 78th Leg., 1975 Sess.
(1975) added an alternative to handling mentally ill criminal defendants by providing
for a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill." See notes 203-06 and accompanying text
infra. The logical inference is that the broad new commitment standard was enacted
to facilitate the civil commitment of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity.
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ards, a broader standard applied to persons acquitted by reason of in-
sanity may violate due process and equal protection requirements.
74
2. Review and Release Provisions7 5 -a. Review-An initial commit-
ment order may not exceed sixty days. Before this period expires, the
hospital director may petition the court for a ninety-day order. The same
procedure is followed if an order for continuing hospitalization is sought.
An individual is entitled to a hearing within fourteen days of the court's
receipt of all such petitions. 76 Michigan guarantees that, every six months
after the court enters an order for continuing hospitalization, every men-
tal patient is entitled to a review of his status by the hospital director.
77
If the resident objects to the finding of any particular review he has the
right to petition the court for a discharge. 78 He is also entitled to a court
hearing once each year after the date of the first order of continuing hos-
pitalization. 79 However, this review is limited by the requirement that the
resident present a physician's report to support his claim for release. If
no certificate accompanies the petition as a result of the resident's indigence
or inability to procure such a report, the court must appoint a physician.
If the physician's report does not support the resident's claim for release,
the petition for discharge is dismissed. While many states require the resi-
dent to pay for this outside examination, Michigan pays the expenses of
indigent residents. 80 One disadvantage of these hearings is that they re-
quire initiation by the patient rather than occurring as a matter of course.
This is detrimental to poorly represented residents.
b. Release-The hospital director is permitted to discharge patients
whom he deems clinically suitable for release but is required to discharge
persons committed under court order who no longer meet the criteria for
persons requiring treatment. 81 Prior law empowered the director to release
persons no longer dangerous but did not require him to do so. 82 Since the
release of nondangerous mental patients has become the subject of public
controversy, this issue will be discussed in conjunction with the release of
criminally committed patients in part III infra.
74 People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 538-44, 221 N.W.2d 569, 581-84 (1974).
See part III infra.
75 See generally Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1376-98.
76 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 330.1472, 330.1452 (1975).
77 MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1482 (1975). An order for continuing hospital-
ization follows the sixty and ninety-day orders. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
330.1472 (1975).
78 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1484 (1975).
70 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1485 (1975).
80 Compare Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1380 with
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1485 (1975).
81 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1476 (1975).
82 Law of June 22, 1937, no. 104, § 25(a), [1937] Mich. Laws 108 (repealed 1974).
See also R. ROCK, supra note 52, at 215-18 discussing the decision to discharge.
Generally, the decision depends on circumstances over which the patient has
little control. For example, the environment to which the patient will be dis-
charged constitutes a major factor in the release decision. A hospital will make
more of an effort to treat and release patients with family, friends, or social support
than it will to treat and release individuals who lack this support.
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II. RIGHTS OF RECIPIENTS OF MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES
While violations of procedural due process in the commitment pro-
ceedings are highly visible and easily reviewable by a higher court, it is
more difficult to effectively monitor and safeguard the rights of those in-
side the mental institution. Although the new Code implements several
humane and innovative protections, it remains difficult to ascertain
whether residents are receiving the benefits of these new provisions.
A. Right to Treatment8 3
1. Case Law-A constitutional right to treatment was not expressly
recognized until Wyatt v. Stickney.84 In Wyatt, a federal district court held
that the state's failure to provide adequate treatment to persons involun-
tarily committed violated due process. The court later issued a decree
which set out minimum constitutional standards for the treatment of
mental patients and for the physical conditions of mental facilities.8 5 The
Wyatt standards include the rights to privacy, visitation, communication,
and freedom from excessive medication and unnecessary physical restraint
or seclusion. The order declared that each patient is entitled to an individ-
ualized plan of treatment and to the least restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of commitment.
On appeal Wyatt was consolidated with Burnham v. Department of
Public Health,8 6 in which another district court had held that no constitu-
tional right to treatment existed and that even if it did, the courts were un-
able to enforce that right due to the lack of judicially manageable stand-
ards. The Fifth Circuit upheld Wyatt,8 7 and reversed and remanded Burn-
ham,88 thereby approving the constitutional right to treatment and rejecting
the Burnham conclusion that the courts are not suited to the task of im-
plementing the right to treatment.
No Supreme Court case has yet ruled directly on the issue of the consti-
tutional right to treatment. In Donaldson v. O'Connor,89 the Fifth Circuit
upheld a district court's award of damages to a former involuntarily com-
mitted patient for deprivation of his constitutional right to liberty. The
court held that a
83 See generally Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of
Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447 (1973); Schwitzgebel, The Right to
Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936 (1974); Schwitzgebel, Right to
Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Ob-
jective Criteria, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 513 (1973); Developments-
Civil Commitment, supra note 10, at 1316-58; Symposium-The Right to Treatment,
57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1973).
84 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See Developments-Civil Commitment,
supra note 10, at 1194-95 n.11.
85 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
86 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd and remanded, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
87 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
88 503 F.2d 1305, 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
89493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital
has a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as
will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve
his mental condition.90
The court limited this broad right to nondangerous patients who were
committed because of their need for treatment.91 Due process, the court
of appeals held, requires that treatment be provided for parens patriae
commitments, or that patients be released.
The Supreme Court, vacating and remanding the Fifth Circuit decision,
based its decision on very narrow grounds. 92 Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, found it unnecessary to decide whether dangerous patients
have a right to treatment after involuntary commitment. He also declined
to consider whether the State may "compulsorily confine a nondangerous,
mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. '93 The Court held
that it is unconstitutional for a state to merely confine a nondangerous
person who could survive in society with the help of family and friends,
and that the facts of the particular case revealed that the state's confine-
ment of Donaldson violated his constitutional right to freedom. Justice
Burger's concurring opinion clearly evidences an intent to avoid approval
of the Fifth Circuit's finding of a constitutional right to treatment. 94 Thus,
the Court avoided the right to treatment issue by focusing on the depriva-
tion of the appellant's liberty without due process.9 5
2. Michigan Right to Treatment Statutes9 6-Michigan law does not
expressly grant a right to treatment which will afford a resident an oppor-
tunity to be cured or improve his condition as Wyatt suggests. However,
the statutes guarantee the same basic rights that Wyatt held to be elements
of the constitutional right to treatment. Each resident is entitled to "mental
health services suited to his condition and to a safe, sanitary, and humane
living environment."97 Professor Morris criticizes this statute as merely
establishing a "bare bones" right to treatment without providing any sub-
stance to that right. 98A right to an individualized, written plan of services
9o ld. at 520.
91 Id. at 527.
92 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
93 Id. at 573.
94 Id. at 580.
95 While Donaldson does little to support the existence of a constitutional right to
treatment, a few days later the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Burnham, see
note 86 and accompanying text supra, leaving intact the Wyatt decision guarantee-
ing the right to treatment.
96 See Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental Patients: Committing the
Legislature, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1974). Professor Morris analyzed the Michigan
provisions dealing with the rights of mental patients confined in an institution. He
found that in many cases, the statutes are worded so broadly that excessive discretion
is permitted. Id. at 986-87. Although his criticism is valid in several instances, the
Emergency Administrative Rules adopted to implement the Michigan Mental Health
Code (filed with the Secretary of State Nov. 6, 1974 and Aug. 15, 1975) often
clarify such vagueness. Furthermore, an overly rigid statute does not lend itself to
expansive interpretation and therefore, is not conducive to growth in the law.
97 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1708 (1975).
98 Morris, supra note 96, at 986.
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is also provided, but without detail as to the required elements of the
plan.99 Morris criticizes the legislature for enacting no standards, yet sug-
gests that an independent "Mental Treatment Standards Board" would be
a more suitable body to prepare minimum treatment standards, since legis-
lative standards could only be improved through the slower legislative
process. 100
Despite Professor Morris' fear that the Department of Mental Health
would be an improper body to set standards since it must also adhere to
them, the Department's Emergency Rules 10 ' appear as demanding as any
that would be established by an independent body. According to these
Rules, a "safe, sanitary and humane living environment" includes the right
to basic human dignity and privacy, adequate clothing, facilities for phys-
ical exercise and social interaction, adequate sanitary facilities, and
extensive quantitative requirements designed to maintain the physical
condition of the institution. 10 2 Significantly, these standards closely parallel
the Wyatt standards.
103
The Rules outline extensive requirements for the individualized plan of
services which appear to be modeled on the Wyatt order.10 4 Both require
that a plan be developed by mental health professionals within five days
of the patient's admission, and require that the plan include a statement
of the patient's specific problems, needs, strengths and weaknesses, a de-
termination of the least restrictive treatment or setting necessary to achieve
the purposes of the commitment, a statement of goals with a projected
timetable for attainment, and criteria to be met for release or discharge.
The Rules also require that notation of all medication, restraint, surgical
99 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1712 (1975). One wonders whether it is beyond
the expertise of a legislature to enact comprehensive statutes defining what treat-
ment is "adequate" for a particular mental condition.
100 Morris, supra note 96, at 986-87.
101 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES,
ch. 7 (1975).
102 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7151 (1975).
103 See 344 F. Supp. 373, 381-83, and notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
Cf. Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and Wyatt: An Administrative-Law Model
for Expanding and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to Treatment, 61 VA. L.
REv. 297, 303-08 (1975) in which the authors warn that extensive quantitative
standards to insure a clean environment and properly trained and licensed personnel
do not always insure adequate treatment. The emphasis on numbers leads to "ad-
ministrative manipulation" of patients, less individualized care, and reduction of
resident population to improve ratios. The authors' view is corroborated by the
experience of Michigan State Senator Joseph Snyder who, while touring one state
institution, found a patient who had been lying on his bed in his own vomit for
over two hours because of the lack of attendants on the floor. His inquiry revealed
that the department report showed the facility had one employee for every two
patients. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the report included
janitors, dishwashers, and every other employee of the facility. 14 Gongwer News
Serv., Mich. Report No. 104 (May 30, 1975).
104 Compare MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMER-
GENCY RULES R. 330.7199 (1975) with Wyatt standards in 344 F. Supp. 373, 384-86
(M.D. Ala. 1972). See also note 102 and accompanying text supra.
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procedures, and limitations of privileges be entered into the record with
the reasons therefore. 10 5 Furthermore, the Rules adopt four of Professor
Morris' suggestions for the content of treatment plans: an estimated date
of release, a description of services to be provided after release, a require-
ment for periodic review of the plan every ninety days, and upon review
an assessment of reasons that the goals in the plan were or were not
met. 106 The individualized plan will not always help the resident improve
his condition, but it does provide a reviewing court with evidence to use in
determining the adequacy of treatment provided by the hospital.10 7 If the
plan merely amounts to custodial care, the court could release the resi-
dent on the basis of the statutory or constitutional right to treatment. The
court also is in a position to expand the concepts of "humane environ-
ment" or "adequate treatment." The availability of judicial review of treat-
ment conditions in addition to extensive departmental rules regarding the
adequacy of treatment diminishes the need for legislatively prescribed
standards. 108
B. Right to Refuse Treatment: Psychosurgery,
Electroshock Treatment, and Chemotherapy
1. Constitutional Bases-The volume of literature in the area of the
right to refuse treatment appears to be growing faster than the com-
mentary on the right to treatment. 0 9 Therefore, this section will only
briefly discuss the Michigan law pertaining to the patient's right to refuse
treatment.
Several commentators argue that a constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment can be derived from the first, fourth, and eighth amendments, as
105 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7199 (1975).
106 1d. See Morris, supra note 96, at 988.
137 Morris, supra note 96, was convinced that the
Wyatt requirements for individualized treatment plans state with par-
ticularity items which can be evaluated by courts to determine [the]
adequacy of treatment in individual cases.
Id. at 987.
108 Other sections adopted to insure a resident's right to treatment are MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1710 (annual physical examination); § 330.1714 (right to
be informed of one's clincal status at reasonable intervals); § 330.1715 (right to see
one's private physician at any reasonable time); and § 330.1722 (no physical, sexual,
or other abuse of recipient).
109 See Knowles, Beyond the Cuckoo's Nest: A Proposal for Federal Regulation of
Psychosurgery, 12 HARV. J. LEGIS. 610 (1975); Schwartz, In the Name of Treatment:
Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 808 (1975); Spoonhour, Psychosurgery and Informed Consent, 26 U. FLA. L.
REV. 432 (1974); Symposium-Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L. REV. 215 (1974); Com-
ment, The Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modification and the Involuntarily
Committed, 23 CATm. U.L. REV. 774 (1974); Comment, Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental
Health: Involuntary Mental Patient Cannot Give Informed Consent to Experimental
Psychosurgery, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 207 (1974); Comment, Informed
Consent and the Mental Patient: California Recognizes a Mental Patient's Right to
Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock Treatment, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW.. 725 (1975y;
Note, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48
TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975).
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well as from the developing right of privacy."10 These constitutional sources
are viewed as creating rights to individual autonomy, self-determination,
and bodily integrity. The fourth amendment can be construed as protect-
ing one's bodily integrity from unwarranted governmental intrusion,
and the due process clause has been used to exclude evidence obtained
by violations of bodily integrity which "shock the conscience.""'
Some courts have also recognized a constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment. One of the constitutionally required minimums of the Wyatt decree
was that a patient have the right not to be subjected to experimental re-
search or to treatment procedures such as lobotomy, electroconvulsive
treatment or other unusual and hazardous procedures without his express
and informed consent after consultation with his attorney or any other
party of his choice. 112 In Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health'13
the court found that the use of experimental psychosurgery on involuntarily
confined mental patients, even with the patient's formal consent, violated
a patient's first amendment right to generate ideas as well as his constitu-
tional right to privacy. The crucial issue in Kaimowitz was the ability of
a mental patient to render a competent, knowing, and voluntary consent.
The court held that a mental patient could not give an informed consent
to experimental psychosurgery due to the inherently coercive nature of the
institutional environment.
2. Michigan Statutes-Michigan now provides that a resident "shall
not have surgery performed upon him, nor shall he be the subject of
electro-convulsive therapy" without his consent or the consent of a parent
or guardian legally empowered to consent. 114 In an emergency situation,
consent need not be obtained. 115 In the event that surgery or electroshock
is "deemed advisable," and no one empowered to consent is available,
the probate court may give the required consent after petition and hear-
ing.116
Professor Morris rightly criticizes this statute for not clearly defining
110 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 109, at 820.
111See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(fourth amendment protects the individual from arbitrary governmental intrusion);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (denial of due process for police to pump
stomach of suspected narcotics dealer seen to swallow two capsules). See also
Schwartz, supra note 109, at 819-25.
Reference to representative definitions of psychosurgery will reveal the extent to
which such procedures violate an individual's bodily integrity. Spoonhour, supra
note 109, at 432 defines it as "a medical procedure in which brain tissue is either
destroyed, removed, or cut with the intent to alter thoughts, emotions or behavior"
(footnote omitted). See also Symposium, supra note 109, at 301.
112 344 F. Supp. at 380.
113 Civil no. 73-194349AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), sum-
inarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2064 (July 31, 1973).
114 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1716 (1975). This should be compared with
California's right to refuse psychosurgery and shock treatment. CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE §§ 5326.3, 5326.4 (West Supp. 1976), analyzed in Comment, Informed
Consent and the Mental Patient: California Recognizes a Mental Patient's Right to
Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock Treatment, 15 SANTA CLAA LAW. 725 (1975).
115 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1716 (1975).
116 ld.
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situations which require a patient's consent.117 Since a person can be men-
tally ill but not incompetent, 118 the statute should require that a resident
be found legally incompetent by a court before a guardian's consent may
be substituted. The Department Rules eliminate some of the confusion
by defining "guardian" as a "person empowered to execute a consent
pursuant to a probate court order." 119 This implies that a guardian is
empowered to consent only after a court finds a resident incapable of
rendering his own informed consent.' 20 The statute is also unclear as to
the nature of the hearing and the type of evidence required for the probate
court to substitute its consent for that of the incompetent patient or un-
available guardian. 12' The statute should also provide the patient with an
opportunity to contest any operation, therapy, or procedure. 122 The Rules
require only that the person in charge of the recipient's plan of service pe-
tition the court to hold the hearing, and do not state whether the patient
may be represented at such a hearing.
12 3
The statute itself does not define what is required to establish an in-
formed consent. It establishes a right to refuse psychosurgery but does not
recognize that institutional coercion may impair the resident's ability to
refuse. 12 4 The Department Rules provide that an informed consent re-
quires (1) competency to understand the procedures, risks, and con-
sequences; (2) knowledge of the procedure and risks subject to the dis-
closure standards (that which a reasonable patient needs to know in order
to make an intelligent decision); and (3) voluntariness, which assumes
free choice without coercion, including promises or assurances of priv-
ileges or freedom. The patient must also be told that he is free to withdraw
his consent to the procedure at any time. 125 Not only is the statute unclear
as to what constitutes a valid consent, it does not specify who is to deter-
mine when a person is incapable of executing a valid consent. If the pro-
posed procedures would expose the patient to risk, either because the
procedure is still experimental, or consists of electroshock, behavior
modifying aversive therapy, or psychosurgery, the Rules require a review
117 Morris, supra note 96, at 992.
118 MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1489 (1975) provides that a finding that a
person requires treatment does not give rise to a presumption of or constitute a find-
ing of legal incompetence.
119 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7001(f) (1975).
120MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1491 (1975) permits the court, upon petition,
to consider and determine the issue of legal competence at the commitment hearing,
and to appoint a guardian if necessary.
121 See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra. The court, upon petition and
hearing, may consent to a procedure which is "deemed advisable" if no one eligible
to give consent can be found "after diligent effort." MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
330.1716(3) (1975).
122 Morris, supra note 96, at 993.
123 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7014(9) (1975).
124 See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
125 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7003 (1975).
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committee to assess the benefits and risks of the procedure. 1 26 If the
review committee approves, a consent committee must then oversee the
selection of subjects for the procedure and the manner in which consent
is obtained. Thus, the Rules vest the determination of effective, capable
consent in a committee appointed by the hospital director. The com-
mittee may determine that a subject has "sufficient mental capacity to
understand what is proposed and to express an opinion as to participation
even though not capable of legal consent.' 1 2 , It has been persuasively
argued that a decision concerning the capacity to consent to brain surgery
or electroshock is of such magnitude that it should be made in the same
manner as one to determine mental capacity during a commitment hear-
ing or guardianship proceeding in a court of law.128 Capacity to consent
is the exercise of a legal right and therefore involves a legal issue which
should be decided accordingly.
129
C. Restraint and Seclusion of Residents
The use of mechanical restraints is generally looked upon with disfavor
in this country, yet only about one-half of the states have attempted to reg-
ulate their use by statute. 130 Michigan authorizes the physical restraint or
seclusion of a resident if "essential in order to prevent the resident from
physically harming himself or others, or in order to prevent him from
causing substantial property damage."'131 Seclusion may also be ordered
for the therapeutic benefit of the resident. 132 Restraint may not be insti-
tuted except pursuant to a physician's order after a personal examination.
133
Seclusion requires the order of a qualified professional person." 4 If an
emergency situation arises, the resident may be restrained or secluded
without such an order, but a physician or qualified professional must be
contacted to examine the resident immediately after the restraint or seclu-
sion is imposed.
135
In addition, the statute permits the restraint or seclusion of a resident
upon the authorization of a physician or qualified professional. Such
authorization remains in effect until the physician or professional can
126 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7021(6) (1975).
127 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7021(8) (1975).
128 Comment, supra note 114, at 754-56. California is considering requiring judicial
determination of capacity to consent before shock treatment can be administered. Id.
at 759.
129 Id. at 754-57.
130 S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 159.
131 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1740(2), 330.1742(2) (1975).
132 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1742(2) (1975).
133 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1740 (1975).
134 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1742 (1975). MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH,
MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES R. 330.7243 (1) (b) (1975) provides that a
"qualified professional" is a mental health professional specifically authorized by a
facility director pursuant to section 742(6) of the Code.
135 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1740, 330.1742 (1975).
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personally examine the resident and determine whether an order should
issue. 136 Despite the apparent intent to shield residents from arbitrary or
punitive restraint or seclusion orders, no clear guidelines are offered
those physicians and staff members who must make the determination that
restraint or seclusion is essential to prevent physical harm or property
damage. While some measure of discretion is inherent in any legal standard
governing treatment decisions, the statute should state those factors which
may properly be considered in reaching any decision. Any restraint or
seclusion order based in whole or in part on evidence of dangerousness
adduced at the commitment hearing should be prohibited. Evidence of a
resident's dangerousness compiled within the institution should be the
sole basis for a finding that some form of restriction is essential. 13 7 This
will protect the resident from the improper inference that previous dan-
gerous behavior makes it more likely that he will be dangerous within
the controlled environment of the mental institution.
Once restraint or seclusion is deemed essential and an order is issued,
the Rules provide some protections for the resident. Full documentation
must be entered on the resident's record, including full justification for
the action, and reasons why a less restrictive alternative would not have
sufficed. 138 The orders for restraint or seclusion automatically terminate
twenty-four hours after they are given, although an order may be renewed
for another twenty-four hour period.13 9 Unlike an order, an authorization
for restraint or seclusion expires after one hour. 140 A resident in restraint
or seclusion must be evaluated by a mental health professional twice daily,
inspected by ward personnel at least every fifteen minutes, and provided
hourly access to toilet facilities.
141
There is no apparent reason for requiring that a physician execute the
restraint order when the statutory justification is to prevent harm to per-
sons or property, while not requiring a physician's order for seclusion,
which may be based upon the therapeutic benefit of the resident. If se-
clusion is in fact beneficial, the law should require a physician to make
that determination.
1 42
Even where some kind of restraint is essential, certain methods are
preferable to others. The statute does not proscribe certain undesirable
types of physical restraints. The Rules provide that physical restraint may
only be used after quiet room, drugs, or seclusion have been utilized, and
that the devices may not be steel or metal unless required because of crim-
136 Id. See note 141 accompanying text infra.
137 Morris, supra note 96, at 1001.
138 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7243(8) (1975).
139 Id. In other states such orders may terminate from two hours to thirty days
after originally issued, with the majority of hospitals setting a three day limit. S.
BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 160.
140 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7243(6)(a) (1975).
141 Id.
142 Morris, supra note 96, at 1000.
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inal arrest or conviction status. 143 Since the use of restraints is inhumane
and counterproductive in some situations, protection from outmoded or
painful devices should be elevated to the statutory level.
Despite administrative regulations which protect the person once he is
restrained or secluded, either by improving the physical and sanitary con-
ditions or by regulating the length of each order, there is no way to prevent
all abuses. Assuming the physician's good faith, requiring a physician's
order is probably the best way to ensure that restraint or seclusion will not
be used for punishment. However, a problem arises where punishment
in the form of physical restraint is used for behavior modification treat-
ment. In such cases it is difficult to distinguish "treatment" from abuses
of restraint and seclusion.1
4 4
The physical restraint statute ignores the prevalent and increasing use of
drugs to accomplish physical restraint. 14' Clearly, the use of chemical re-
straint is subject to the same abuse as the use of physical devices. 146 Michi-
gan's chemotherapy statute covers use of medication before the preliminary
and commitment hearings, but does not deal with drug use once the person
becomes a resident. 47 Although the Rules provide that medication shall be
administered only upon the order of a physician complying with federal
standards and that it may not be used for punishment or for the con-
venience of the staff, a recent state audit has revealed the widespread use
of psychotropic drugs in excess of recommended maximum doses in Mich-
igan's state mental hospitals.
148
D. Communication and Visitation
A patient also enjoys rights preventing unwarranted seclusion from the
outside world. The right of communication was the first right guaranteed
by statute in most states.' 49 Today, forty states have legislation protecting
patient correspondence, and over one-half of these protect visitation. 50
In Michigan, a resident is entitled to "unimpeded, private, and uncensored
143 MicH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7243(2), (18) (1975).
144 S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 160.
145 Id. at 160-61.
146 Id.
147 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1718 (1975).
148 Compare MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY
RULES R. 330.7158(1)-(3) (1975) with the findings of a state audit reported in the
Detroit Free Press, March 19, 1976, § A, at 12, col. 1. The audit found that 97 percent
of the patients surveyed receive at least one psychotropic drug and about one-half
receive more than one, a practice "not clinically supported as a generally accepted
practice in treating schizophrenic patients." The report also discovered that 30 per-
cent of the patients receive drugs in excess of recommended maximums without an
explanation of any medical rationale in their records. Over 70 percent of all records
surveyed contained no documentation "of the therapeutic rationale for using psycho-
tropic drugs."
149 S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 155.
150 Id.
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communication" by mail, phone, or visitation except in cases where a
limitation is "essential in order to prevent the resident from violating the
law or to prevent substantial and serious physical or mental harm to the
resident." 151 Any limitation must be approved by the head of the facility
or his designee and no limitation may apply to communication between
a resident and his attorney.
152
The requirement that the hospital director approve each limitation offers
greater protection where hospitals are understaffed and physicians have
little time to make every decision for each individual patient. In such
cases, patient correspondence decisions might otherwise be delegated to
nonmedical personnel who are unqualified to decide what restrictions
are necessary for a resident's welfare.' 53 Although a medical determination
was probably intended, the Michigan statute does not require that a
physician make the determination that a restriction is essential.' 54 Never-
theless, some protection from abuse is afforded by the requirements that
limitation decisions be entered into the resident's record, that the resident
be promptly notified of each limitation, and that he have an opportunity
to bring an administrative appeal to contest the limitation. 55
By exempting attorney-client communication from limitation the statute
appears to adequately protect the resident's right to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 15 6 Department Rules provide the resident a right to cor-
respond by telephone or mail and to receive visits from his private
physician, a mental health professional, an attorney, or another person
where the communication involves "matters which are or may be the
subject of legal inquiry."'
1 57
The Department Rules properly place greater restrictions on incoming
mail than on outgoing mail since limits on incoming mail are more essential
to a resident's medical welfare? 5s Outgoing mail or phone calls may be
limited only if essential to prevent serious physical or mental harm or
to prevent a resident from violating a law.' 59 Outgoing calls may also be
151MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1726 (1975).
152 Id.
153 S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 157. A ward attendant is not the
proper person to decide what restrictions are necessary for the patient's medical
welfare.
154 Morris, supra note 96, at 1009.
155 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7239 (1975).
156 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1726(7) (1975). Only eighteen states guaran-
teed this right by 1971. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 156.
157 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7239(7) (1975). The right of a mental patient to make unrestricted telephone
calls to his attorney or to relatives for aid in obtaining his release from the hospital
was recognized in Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971).
158 Compare S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 10, at 157 (discussion of failure of
statutes to differentiate between incoming and outgoing mail) with MICH. DEP'T OF
MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES R. 330.7239 (1975).
159 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7239(5)(b)(C) (1975).
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restricted to prevent future telephone harassment of an individual who
has executed a written complaint. 1 0
The statute, therefore, appears to sufficiently protect a resident's right
to communicate with the outside world, despite its failure to supply any
legislative guidelines for determining when a restriction is essential, or to
clearly identify those authorized to make such a determination. 16
III. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER TEN
The disposition of mentally ill individuals who are charged with crime
but are incompetent to stand trial or who have been acquitted by reason
of insanity raises special problems. Prior to Michigan's new Code, a de-
fendant could be committed upon a finding of incompetency by the trial
court, despite a probate court finding that he could not be committed un-
der the standards for civil commitment. Michigan law also required auto-
matic commitment without a hearing for persons acquitted by reason of
insanity. Michigan now extends the protections of due process and equal
protection to criminal defendants.
A. Incompetency to Stand Trial
1. The Incompetency Problem-Prior to Jackson v. Indiana,162 a de-
fendant judged incompetent to stand trial usually faced indefinite and
potentially unlimited incarceration. A person found incompetent to stand
trial was committed to a mental health facility until he regained compe-
tency, since the conviction of a legally incompetent defendant had been
held to be a violation of due process. 163 One critic argued that a finding
of incompetency had become "merely a diagnosis by psychiatrists of the
defendant's mental illness" and was a tool to incarcerate persons for in-
definite periods without a criminal conviction or civil commitment.
6 4
Rather than protecting the individual's due process right, the incompetency
label was often used for preventive detention of undesirables arrested on
minor charges.
Jackson involved the constitutionality of an Indiana law which required
that a person found incompetent to stand trial be committed to a mental
institution until he regained sanity. Jackson argued that if the state sought
160 MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENCY RULES
R. 330.7239(5)(c)(iii) (1975).
161 In addition to the resident's right to unimpeded communication, Michigan has
enacted several other statutes dealing with the privacy and autonomy of the resident
inside the institution. Law of Aug. 21, 1975, no. 208, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 502,
amending MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1724 (1975) (limits fingerprinting and
photographing of residents except those criminally committed); § 330.1728 (right
to receive, possess, and use all personal property unless limitation is essential); §
330.1730 (easy access to one's money unless denial essential to prevent unreasonable
and significant dissipation of assets); § 330.1736 (regulating patient labor and com-
pensation therefor); and § 330.1748 (information in resident's record is confidential).
162406 U.S. 715 (1972).
163 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); Comment, supra note 55, at 561.
164 Comment, supra note 55, at 562-64.
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to commit him indefinitely, it must do so through the civil commitment
procedure. The Court agreed, and held that subjecting Jackson to a more
lenient commitment standard than was applied to persons not charged
with a criminal offense was a denial of equal protection since Jackson was
in effect condemned to permanent institutionalization without the showing
required for commitment. The Court also held that indefinite commit-
ment on the ground of incompetency alone is a violation of due process,
and that such persons
cannot be held more than a reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he
will attain [competency] in the foreseeable future.165
Otherwise, the state must initiate commitment proceedings or release the
defendant. Thus, Jackson requires that incompetency commitments be
brief and that the defendant's condition show progressive improvement in
order to justify continued confinement. 66
2. Michigan's Incompetency Provisions-Prior to 1967, Michigan law
required that persons found incompetent to stand trial be confined in
Ionia State Hospital.16 7 By 1966, however, the legislature had become
aware of abuses of the incompetency procedure. New legislation was
enacted to prevent the use of this procedure as an expedient to dispose
of the charges against defendants who were found incompetent to stand
trial.1 68 The 1967 legislation forbade any criminal proceeding against a
defendant while he was incompetent.' 69 The court could commit the de-
fendant for a sixty-day psychiatric evaluation and if found incompetent to
stand trial, the defendant could then be committed for up to eighteen
months. Upon his release, the defendant could either be civilly committed
by the probate court or transferred back to the original trial court for a
determination of his competency. If the trial court found him incompetent,
the probate court decision was reversed and the defendant immediately
committed. The statute was criticized for its failure to distinguish between
the standard for incompetence to stand trial and that for civil commit-
ment.1 70 Since the two are not identical, a finding of incompetence should
not suffice for involuntary hospitalization. 1 71 The statute, however, allowed
commitment upon a finding of incompetency, even after the probate court
found the defendant not subject to civil commitment.
172
Michigan's new Code also requires the court to order the defendant to
165 406 U.S. at 738.
166 Comment, supra note 55, at 571.
167 Morris, Mental Illness and Criminal Commitnent it, Michigan, 5 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 2, 18 (1971).
168 Id.
169 Law of July 12, 1966, no. 266, § 1, [1966] Mich. Laws 378, amending Law of
May 14, 1927, no. 175, ch. 11, § 7, [1927] Mich. Laws 281 (repealed 1975).
170 Morris, supia note 167, at 32.
171 Id.
172 Law of July 12, 1966, no. 266, § 1, [1966] Mich. Laws 378, amending Law of
May 14, 1927, no. 175, ch. 11, § 7, [1927] Mich. Laws 281 (repealed 1975).
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submit to an examination to determine his competency to stand trial.17 3
However, the defendant need not be committed to the examiner's custody
unless he refuses to make himself available voluntarily. If the defendant
is to be held in jail before trial, the examination will take place there.
17 4
A defendant need not spend the full sixty days in the custody of the center
for forensic psychiatry unless such confinement is necessary to complete
the examination.
175
After the examination, the court has two alternatives. If it determines
that the defendant is incompetent and has no probability of gaining com-
petence within the lesser of fifteen months or one-third of the maximum
sentence he could receive upon conviction, the court may authorize the
prosecutor to initiate civil commitment proceedings. 176 If the court de-
termines that the defendant could regain competence, it may order him to
undergo treatment, but it may only commit him to the custody of the De-
partment of Mental Health if necessary to implement the treatment.
7 7
If the defendant would have been in jail before trial, the court may in es-
sence "commit" him to the facility in which he will be treated. 178 Such an
order expires after the fifteen months or one-third of the maximum sen-
tence, or whenever charges are dropped. 179 The defendant must then be
released or committed under the standards for involuntary civil commit-
ment. 180 However, during this commitment, the examining psychiatrist
must report to the court every ninety days,' 8' and the court must rehear
and redetermine the issue of incompetency unless the defendant waives
the hearing.182 In short, the new Code decreases the maximum length of
incompetency commitments from eighteen months to fifteen months, or
one-third of the maximum sentence if it is less, and provides for periodic
redeterminations of the defendant's status. These provisions enable the
defendant either to regain competency, to contest the findings of incom-
petence in the examining psychiatrist's report at reasonable intervals, or,
in the event he does not become competent, to avoid the lengthier eighteen-
month commitment of the previous Code.
The new provisions also eliminate the tendency to treat a finding of
incompetency to stand trial as equivalent to a finding of mental illness
requiring involuntary civil commitment. Whereas under prior law a trial
court's finding of incompetency would automatically reverse a probate
.court finding that the defendant did not meet the civil commitment cri-
teria, 8 3 the new Code provides that a finding of incompetency to stand
173 MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 330.2026(1) (1975).
174 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2026(2) (1975).
175 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.2026(3) (1975).
17 6 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2031 (1975).
177 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2032 (1975).
178 Id.
179 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2034 (1975).
180 ld. See notes 48-74 and accompanying text supra.
18 1 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.2038 (1975).
182 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.2040 (1975).
183 See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
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trial cannot be used to hold the defendant after the initial fifteen-month
commitment period. If the incompetency commitment period expires and
the defendant is still unable to stand trial, the state must rely on civil
commitment procedures to confine the individual.
84
B. Disposition of Persons Found Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity
1. Commitment-Prior to People v. McQuillan,185 Michigan law re-
quired automatic commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity.186 The acquitted defendant was not given a hearing to determine
whether he was presently mentally ill and in need of treatment. The
Michigan Supreme Court in McQuillan interpreted the statute to require
such a hearing before such persons could be committed. 8 7 While the court
agreed that past criminal conduct caused by insanity justifies temporary
detention for examination, it said that such conduct does not justify
permanent detention. It held that the statute required at most a sixty-day
detention of such defendants to enable the hospital to examine and observe
the individual. 8 8 Immediately thereafter, the former defendant is entitled
to notice and a hearing as to his present mental condition.18 9 Detention for
more than sixty days as provided by the automatic commitment statute
was held to be a violation of due process and equal protection. 190 Although
a defendant may have been insane at the time he committed the criminal
act, he may not be insane for the purpose of civil commitment. 191 Conse-
quently, a deprivation of liberty without a hearing violates due process.
The court also held that commitment without a hearing violates equal
protection, since the state provides full judicial protection to those civilly
committed. 192 The court recognized that those civilly and criminally com-
mitted are not similarly situated, but that this difference in class only
justifies the sixty-day period of detention for examination.
The Michigan Legislature responded to the McQuillan decision by re-
placing the automatic commitment statute with a statute requiring a sixty-
184 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2034 (1975).
185 392 Mich. 511, 211 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
186 Law of July 12, 1966, no. 266, § 1, [1966] Mich. Laws 378, amending Law of
May 14, 1927, no. 175, ch. 11, § 7, [1927] Mich. Laws 281 (repealed 1975) pro-
vided that:
Any person who is tried for a crime and is acquitted by the court or
jury by reason of insanity, .shall be committed immediately by order
of the court to the department of mental health ....
187 392 Mich. at 536-37, 221 N.W.2d at 580-81.
188 Id. at 525-29, 221 N.W.2d at 575-77.
189 Id. at 529-36, 221 N.W.2d at 577-80.
190 14. at 529, 221 N.W.2d at 577.
191 Id. at 533, 221 N.W.2d at 579. The court reasoned that, since a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity is not a finding of insanity but is rather a finding
that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was competent when he committed the crime, there should be no presumption of
continuing insanity. Id. at 531, 221 N.W.2d at 578.
192 Id. at 533-36, 221 N.W.2d at 579-80.
SPPJNG 1976]
Journal of Law Reform
day temporary detention for persons acquitted by reason of insanity.
9 3
During this period the individual's present mental condition is observed and
evaluated by the center for forensic psychiatry, which is required to file a re-
port containing its opinion as to whether the person meets the criteria for civil
commitment. The prosecutor may then file a petition seeking commitment
pursuant to procedures for civil commitment. If the petition is not there-
after filed, the person must be released from custody. Thus, Michigan now
provides the same standard and hearing for those committed on the basis
of either criminal or civil proceedings. However, in a later amendment, the
legislature allowed the report from the trial court, containing the facts
concerning the crime for which the individual was acquitted, to be ad-
mitted in the hearings. 194 The original statute made no provision for the
admissibility of such evidence. 195 Since the issues at the hearing are the
individual's present mental condition and whether he is presently dan-
gerous, evidence of past criminal behavior should not be conclusive as to
the individual's present dangerousness. Indeed, such evidence could well
be unjustifiably prejudicial considering the vagueness of the commitment
criteria and the problems involved in predicting future dangerousness. 196
Since an aquittal by reason of insanity does not give rise to a presumption
of insanity, 197 evidence of past criminal behavior, without more, should not
result in a finding of dangerousness.
2. Release-McQuillan also held that discharge procedures similar to
those provided for persons civilly committed must be provided for those
acquitted by reason of insanity.198 In response, the Michigan Legislature
enacted a bill requiring that the civil release provisions apply to the crim-
inally committed, except that persons acquitted by reason of insanity may
not be discharged without first being evaluated and recommended for
193 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050 (1975).
194 Law of July 25, 1975, no. 179, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 381, amending MicH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.2050 (1975).
19 5 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.2050 (1975).
196 See part I B supra. It seems clear that evidence of past crimes could provide
a court with the necessary "handle" to substantiate a finding that a person can
"reasonably be expected in the near future" to cause serious harm. That is, past
criminal behavior could provide the "act" which the statute requires to support any
expectation of future dangerous behavior.
The case of Dr. Daniel Boucher illustrates the potential for prejudice caused by
allowing evidence of the crime for which a defendant was acquitted by reason of
insanity to be considered by the committing court. Dr. Boucher murdered his ex-
wife and seven year old son. After his murder conviction was reversed, he was
found incompetent to stand trial. He was later committed after being found mentally
ill and dangerous. Although his crime was particularly violent, he claimed that his
wife was the only person he ever wanted to kill and that he would never kill anyone
again. Detroit Free Press, Nov. 2, 1975, § A, at 3, col. 1. It is possible that his danger-
ousness was limited to that one situation, and that, as to society at large, Boucher
presented no threat. However, a judge or jury confronted with the details of his
crime could not avoid the conclusion that Boucher was dangerous. The purpose of
the hearing for persons acquitted by reason of insanity is to determine the individual's
present mental condition. Evidence of a crime committed while the individual was
insane may distract the fact-finder from the issue at hand.
197 See note 192 supra.
198 392 Mich. at 540, 211 N.W.2d at 582.
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discharge by the forensic psychiatry program. 99 Therefore, a person
criminally committed must be released when the hospital director finds
him clinically suitable, or when he is no longer presently dangerous and
therefore does not meet the criteria for a person requiring treatment.
200
Vigorous public reaction resulted from the prospect of the release of
persons acquitted by reason of insanity who did not meet the civil com-
mitment criteria, 2 1 and the release of persons from mental institutions
who were not presently dangerous and therefore could not be held. 20 2
In response, the legislature enacted a statute which enables a court or jury
to find a defendant "guilty but mentally ill"203 instead of acquitting him
by reason of insanity, thereby removing the risk that he may not .be civilly
committable. The trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense,
but that he was not legally insane at that time.20 4 A convicted defendant
is then committed to the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions under a criminal sentence. 205 He may either receive psychiatric care
there or be transferred to a mental health facility. Since he must be re-
turned to prison after treatment, he will not be released upon a determina-
tion that he is no longer mentally ill and dangerous. The sponsors of the
statute sought to circumvent the McQuillan decision by eliminating the
release of persons after they are acquitted by reason of insanity. 20 6
Whether such criminal punishment in the absence of criminal responsibility
will survive constitutional challenge is open to conjecture. The purpose and
intent of the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict is punitive and preventive
rather than rehabilitative. It is a reflection of society's desire for protection
from the violent crimes of the "deranged" or "criminally insane." This
restrictive legislation will confine a person who was not criminally re-
sponsible for a full criminal sentence, even though he later regains his
competency. Perhaps such legislation is to be expected, however, until
199 Law of July 25, 1975, no. 179, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 381, amending MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050 (1975). The original provisions did not apply civil
release standards to persons acquitted by reason of insanity.
2 00 See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1476 (1975) and part I B 2 b supra.
201 See Comment, supra note 34, at 251 n.108, for a list of Michigan cases.
202 State Representative Otterback conducted public hearings to assess the impact
of the new Code. He noted that concerns have been expressed dealing with the
recent release of potentially dangerous mental patients. 14 Gongwer News Serv., Mich.
Report No. 21 (Jan. 30, 1975).
203 Law of July 25, 1975, no. 180, § 1, [1975] Mich. Laws 385, amending MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 768.20, 768.21 (1970).
204 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(1) (1975).
205 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1975).
206 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, March 24, 1975, § A, at 2, col. 1.
The goal of their bills, State Rep. Rosenbaum said, is to prevent danger-
ous inmates of state hospitals from getting back on the streets to
commit the same horrendous crimes they were committed for.
According to 14 Gongwer News Serv., Mich. Report No. 37 (Feb. 24, 1975), the
"severe" bills were introduced to "deal with problems brought to light" by hearings
on the new Code. In addition, 14 Gongwer News Serv., Mich. Report No. 19 (Jan.
28, 1975) reports that, "Mr. Rosenbaum said the intent of the proposed verdict is
to permit retaining dangerous persons in the corrective system."
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psychiatry proves it can actually provide effective treatment for our crim-
inally insane.
IV. CONCLUSION
Michigan's new Code provides extensive procedural guarantees and
substantive rights to persons facing commitment or undergoing treatment
in a state mental health facility. Any assessment of the effectiveness of
these protections necessarily depends on vigorous enforcement by prac-
ticing attorneys and the newly created Office of Recipient Rights in the
Department of Mental Health. 20 7 To be effective, this office must prove
itself independent from the department of which it is a part.
In addition to enforcing the Code, there remains the problem of inter-
preting it. Imprecise statutes with no legislative guidelines are incapable
of accurate application and permit excessive discretion by courts, physi-
cians, and administrators. The Code's failure to adequately define the
parameters of the right to treatment has created disagreement between
psychiatrists, who claim that "treatment" includes the conditional release
of potentially dangerous patients into community settings, and local pros-
ecutors who claim that the right to treatment does not extend to situations
which place society in danger.2 08 Furthermore, several constitutional issues
remain unresolved. For example, it is unclear whether a state may consti-
tutionally commit an individual who is unable to care for himself yet de-
sires to retain his liberty. It is also unclear whether the "guilty but mentally
ill" verdict provides criminal punishment for one who was not criminally
responsible.
Michigan's new Code represents the potential for long overdue en-
lightened treatment of the mentally ill. The application of due process
protections will minimize the risk of unwarranted commitments, and,
coupled with the rights guaranteed to residents of institutions, should
afford the mentally ill a greater measure of self-respect and personal dig-
nity. Involuntary incarceration is the state's most powerful weapon and
should always be viewed as a last resort. While society's fear of violent
behavior may be justified, that fear should not become a vehicle for more
punitive and restrictive laws in the field of mental health. Hopefully, the
courts will defend the progress already made and become a positive force
by protecting the newly recognized rights of the mentally ill.
-William David Serwer
207 MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1754 (1975) authorizes the department and
each facility to establish such an office to receive reports and investigate apparent
violations of patients' rights. MICH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH
CODE EMERGENCY RULES R. 330.7037 (1975) outlines steps to be taken to protect
the office from "pressures which could interfere with impartial, evenhanded and
thorough performance of its duties." But see Morris, supra note 96, at 1020-23.
208 See Detroit Free Press, Nov. 2, 1975, § A, at 3, col. 1.
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